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ABSTRACT
ML decision-aid systems are increasingly common on the web, but
their successful integration relies on people trusting them appropri-
ately: they should use the system to fill in gaps in their ability, but
recognize signals that the system might be incorrect. We measured
how people’s trust in ML recommendations differs by expertise
and with more system information through a task-based study of
175 adults. We used two tasks that are difficult for humans: com-
paring large crowd sizes and identifying similar-looking animals.
Our results provide three key insights: (1) People trust incorrect
ML recommendations for tasks that they perform correctly the
majority of the time, even if they have high prior knowledge about
ML or are given information indicating the system is not confident
in its prediction; (2) Four different types of system information
all increased people’s trust in recommendations; and (3) Math and
logic skills may be as important as ML for decision-makers working
with ML recommendations.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies→Machine learning; •Human-
centered computing→ Human computer interaction (HCI).
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1 INTRODUCTION
Automated decision-aid systems are increasingly prevalent: doctors
use diagnostic aids [16], judges use risk assessment tools [35], and
HR departments use resume screening [1]. Even outside of these
specialized domains, everyday web users encounter ML-based rec-
ommendations all the time, from search results to targeted ads. In
practice, these systems are embedded in larger sociotechnical sys-
tems involving human decision-makers and institutional structures
[7, 8, 30].
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Ideally, decision-aid systems should augment human decisions
by improving performance when people lack confidence or exper-
tise, but not worsening performance when they would otherwise
act correctly. This requires people to be able to decide when to
trust the system more than their own judgement, and when to not
[21]. Unfortunately, we have seen many cases where ML decision-
aid systems have led to worse decisions that can have harmful
consequences [5, 12, 29, 33].
In order to createML systems and interfaces that better synergize
with humans, it is crucial to develop a robust understanding of how
people trust these systems and their recommendations. Providing
information about a model and its performance has been proposed
as one way to improve appropriate use of ML recommendations
[26], but there have not yet been conclusive empirical evaluations
showing if and to whom this sort of information is useful.
Our work aims to make progress in characterizing how users
with different levels of math, logic, and ML knowledge trust ML
recommendations. Moreover, we study how this trust is influenced
by detailed information about the system and the recommendation.
While a growing body of research focuses on issues of trust in ML,
and more recently on some aspects of system transparency [24, 39],
to our knowledge this is the first study characterizing trust with
respect to both prior knowledge as well as system transparency.
Throughout this paper, we present the design and implementa-
tion of a user study to measure (1) people’s prior knowledge in both
math and logic as well as ML-specific skills, (2) people’s trust in both
correct and incorrect ML recommendations for a range of questions
spanning two different tasks, and (3) how trust changes with infor-
mation about a model’s training data, architecture, performance on
a relevant subset, and details about specific predictions.
Our results have important implications for ML model and in-
terface design, ML education, and regulations around system trans-
parency. In particular, we contribute three key insights:
• People across knowledge levels follow incorrect ML recom-
mendations, even when they would naturally perform the task
correctly, and are given information about the recommendation
that should suggest it is less trustworthy.
• Information about an ML system’s training data, model archi-
tecture, performance, and recommendation all lead to people
following both correct and incorrect recommendations more
often.
• Math and logic skills may be as important as basic ML knowl-
edge for human decision-makers working with ML recommen-
dations.
2 RELATEDWORK
The concept of “trust” in ML decision-aid systems is measured in
different ways, most commonly: ML recommendation agreement
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[19, 28, 39] and perceived trust in a recommendation [15, 17]. Mea-
suring perceived trust/attitude provides insight into emotions such
as fear or bias, but we use recommendation agreement since it
provides a more direct measure of actual behavior.
Our work builds on a growing body of research studying similar
notions of trust in ML. The review in [21] provides a conceptual
model of trust in automation and how it varies with context and
display characteristics. Some studies have shown a preference for
human judgment over algorithmic judgment in “subjective” do-
mains such as joke recommendation [38], after seeing the algorithm
make a mistake [10], or when the algorithmic output is presented
in conjunction with advice from a human [27]. However, recent
work suggests that people may over-trust certain algorithmic rec-
ommendations for a range of different advice settings [24, 29]. [12]
and [33] specifically point out the harm that can occur when people
over-trust algorithmic recommendations that agree with their prior
societal biases (e.g., describing how automated risk scoring in the
criminal justice system can exacerbate racial and socioeconomic
disparities). [35] describes in further detail judges’ complicated use
of implemented risk assessment tools in the criminal justice system
in Kentucky and their impacts over time.
Other work has focused on how various types of information
about a model or recommendation influence trust. Studies have sug-
gested that increased transparency about a recommender system
leads to users following its recommendations more often [6, 32].
An interesting subset of this work has shown that increased trust
can manifest as over-reliance and have negative consequences. For
example, [19] show that more information leads to higher recom-
mendation agreement, even if the information provided is fake.
Similarly, [28] found that participants were less able to correct an
inaccurate algorithmic prediction when given the weights of the
model and variables used. In the clinical context, [2] show how
more detailed explanatory information led physicians to trust a
clinical decision-aid system more, even when its suggestions were
wrong. The work in [17] suggests that the relationship between
amount of information given and trust is complicated, and that
users’ trust in a system can begin to decrease if given too much
information, particularly when the prediction disagrees with their
expectations. [39] found that higher stated accuracy increases peo-
ple’s trust in a model to some extent, but this may be overriden by
seeing its actual performance. However, feedback about a model’s
actual accuracy is rarely immediate for real-world ML applications
(if available at all), so it is useful to focus on the effect of stated
performance information as we do in this study, rather than on
observed performance or feedback.
We note that an important and growing body of work focuses
on studying interpretability methods for ML models and evaluating
their effectiveness with people [11, 18, 37]. Because there is not yet
conclusive evidence on which interpretability methods are most
useful and understandable for users, in this study we choose to sim-
ply state important information about the system and its prediction
in standard ways.
In this work, we aim to better characterize task-based trust as
well as study the influence of stated information. While other work
has focused on narrow categories of given information, we study the
effects of four distinct types of ML system information. Moreover, to
our knowledge, existing work has not yet studied how trust differs
across people with different backgrounds, which we begin to do by
measuring how trust varies with math, logic, and ML knowledge.
3 AIMS & CHALLENGES
Our aim in this study is to measure how people incorporate ML
recommendations into their decision-making, as a product of (1) the
correctness of the recommendation, (2) people’s prior knowledge
of ML and related math/logic skills, and (3) additional information
about the system and recommendation. This study consisted of
two main steps: (1) measuring prior math, logic, and ML knowl-
edge through a set of assessment questions, and (2) measuring
trust in ML recommendations through a set of task-based questions.
Participants sometimes saw these questions along with ML recom-
mendations and/or explanatory information about the system and
recommendation (this procedure will be discussed in detail in later
sections). There were several key challenges therein:
(1) Accurate assessment of a participant’s prior ML, math
and logic knowledge. We asked participants for their per-
ceived ML knowledge and past learning experiences, but self-
assessments can be subjective and inaccurate. At the same time,
validated instruments for assessing these types of knowledge
do not currently exist.
As a result, we needed to design an evaluation of different
types of ML, math, and logic knowledge. This was particu-
larly challenging because the assessment needed to (1) be short,
since these questions would be in addition to the main study
questions, (2) be distributed across a range of knowledge levels,
and (3) encompass not only ML skills but also math and logic
skills, since these topics are important ML pre-requisites and
would allow us to identify people with strong mathemetical
intuition (even if they did not have an ML background).
(2) Effective measurement of human-ML trust. When think-
ing about how to actually measure people’s trust in given ML
recommendations, several challenges arise, including:
(a) Choosing appropriately difficult tasks: In order for
participants to seriously consider the ML recommendations,
it was necessary to select tasks for which people had some
intuition but at the same time, would not be easy.
(b) Presenting real recommendations: We required all
ML recommendations and additional information (architecture,
data, performance, prediction, etc.) to be real in order to mitigate
the potential confounding factor in participants’ behavior if they
detected unrealistic data. Therefore, we also needed to pick tasks
with open-source data and validated model implementations.
4 DATA AND MATERIAL CREATION
Our study required the creation of three distinct materials: (1) As-
sessment questions to measure knowledge of math, logic, and ML,
(2) A set of task-based questions to measure trust with real ML rec-
ommendations, and (3) Explanatory material about the ML systems
and recommendations for each task/question.
4.1 Knowledge Assessment
In step (1) of our study, we assessed participants’ knowledge in
math, logic and ML. To do this, we created 22 knowledge assess-
ment questions split into 3 categories: Logic (3 questions), Math (8
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Figure 1: Example knowledge assessment questions.
questions), and ML (11 questions). The questions sampled impor-
tant topics from each area, ranging in difficulty from concepts that
are common knowledge or secondary education-level knowledge
to those that require advanced domain knowledge. We chose Math
and Logic topics that were particularly relevant to ML.
We created our own assessment because a validated instrument
for assessing ML knowledge does not currently exist. We iterated
all the questions starting from a number of concepts identified in
2 instances of an ML course developed by one of the co-authors
[20]. The Logic questions covered the following concept areas (par-
entheticals indicate the question ID, which will be used to refer to
particular questions later on): correlation and causation (L1), decision
tree logic (L2), and set relationships (L3).
The Math questions covered the following concept areas: curve
fitting (M1), variance of a sample (M2), probability (M3), linear
functions (M4), means and medians (M5), graphical models (M6),
false positives and negatives (M7), and points on a hyperplane (M8).
In order to capture knowledge of individuals familiar with differ-
ent branches of ML, the ML questions covered more concept areas
than the previous categories: describing ML (ML1), scoping an ML
problem (ML2), supervised and unsupervised learning (ML3), training
vs. testing data (ML4), SVMs/kernel functions (ML5), gradient descent
(ML6), k-means clustering (ML7), transfer learning (ML8), regular-
ization (ML9), optimization (ML10), and topic modeling (ML11).
The questions were multiple choice, and all included the option
of “I don’t have knowledge about the subject of the question”. Some
example questions are shown in Fig. 1.
4.2 Task-Based Dataset
In step (2) of the study, participants answered questions with or
without ML recommendations. We selected two different appli-
cations that currently have real ML implementations: (1) telling
apart images of similar-looking animals, and (2) comparing the
numbers of people in photographs of crowds. Both applications
were centered on image recognition tasks to limit variations based
on data modality, and because image-based tasks tend to be faster
and simpler for people as opposed to tasks that require interpreting
text or numerical data. We used a within-subject study design to
test four different treatments (described in Section 5). A participant
would encounter each treatment four times (2 with correct and
2 with incorrect recommendations). We selected four comparable
sub-tasks within each application to avoid confounding and learn-
ing effects resulting from having previously seen an image with
another treatment.
For the animal identification application, the subtasks involved
identifying an image of an animal out of two similar-looking types
of animals: (1) leopards and jaguars, (2) wild boars and hogs, (3)
beavers and marmots, and (4) bullfrogs and tailed frogs. For the
crowd comparison application, the subtasks involved telling apart
which image out of two images had more people, from sets com-
prising of: (1) pictures around Venice plazas, (2) pictures from the
streets of Shanghai, and (3) and (4) pictures of large crowds scraped
from the web, which differed in crowd density.
4.2.1 ML Models. Participants sometimes received ML recommen-
dations and system information for the task-based questions. All
ML-related information was real to avoid introducing a confound-
ing factor into participant behavior. We describe the models and
datasets that we used below.
Animal Identification Application: We used a ResNet50 neural
network [13] pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset [9] implemented
in Keras [4] for all subtasks. Although the direct output of ResNet50
is a probability distribution over 1000 classes, we generated per-
formance metrics specific to our binary classification subtasks. We
calculated the binary accuracy for each subtask using the 50 Ima-
geNet validation images per class. For each of the 100 validation
images per subtask (which spans 2 classes), if ResNet50 predicted
that the probability for the correct class was higher than that of
the incorrect class, it was counted as a correct classification. The
model’s performance on the subtasks ranged from 72% to 89%.
Crowd Comparison Application: We used an implementation [31]
of the multi-column convolutional neural network (MCNN) archi-
tecture trained using part A of the ShanghaiTechDataset [40]. The
subtasks consisted of 4 sets of crowd images that looked distinct and
were sourced from various datasets: (1) UCF-QNRF, consisting of
images of extremely large crowds scraped from the internet [14], (2)
Venice, consisting of images from cameras around a plaza in Venice,
Italy [22, 23], (3) Shanghai A-test, a subset of the ShanghaiTech-
Dataset consisting of images of crowds scraped from the internet
(which differs significantly from UCF-QNRF in crowd density), and
(4) Shanghai B, a subset of the ShanghaiTechDataset consisting of
images from cameras around Shanghai streets. Although MCNN
outputs a predicted count of people in an image, our subtasks are
binary classification problems asking which of two images has
more people. To calculate subtask accuracy, we used the model to
predict the crowd counts for 100 random, non-repeating pairs of
images from the subtask dataset. On these 100 images, if the model
predicted a higher number of people for the image that actually had
more people, this was counted as correct. The model’s performance
on the subtasks ranged from 72% to 93%.
4.2.2 Question Selection. We selected each question by hand in
order to check that the difficulty of the questions were comparable
and that the images were reasonable (e.g., not watermarked, not
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Figure 2: Example screenshots from prediction videos, both normal
(top) and abnormal (bottom).
offensive). Moreover, since some treatments showed explanatory in-
formation such as the ML model’s outputted probablities or counts,
these values also needed to be comparable for the chosen examples.
We observed that examples with incorrect recommendations
fell into two categories: (1) those that appeared normal both in the
image and the recommendation (e.g., high probability for a single
answer, image not dark or blurry), and (2) those that appeared
abnormal either because of the image (e.g., dark, blurry) or because
of the model’s output (e.g., extremely low probabilities/close values
for both classes). We expected that trust would vary across these
different types of errors, so we chose two incorrect recommendation
questions (one “normal” and one “abnormal”) for each subtask, and
two correct recommendation questions (both “normal”).
For the animal identification application, the “abnormal” incor-
rect recommendation questions were those where the ML system
outputted very low and very close probabilites for both classes.
For the crowd comparison application, the “abnormal” incorrect
questions were those where one or both of the crowd images were
dark, blurry, or contained artifacts.
4.3 Explanatory Video Material
In step (2) of the study, participants sometimes received explanatory
information about the ML system and recommendation. Videos
with voiceover were used to convey the information as opposed
to text or static graphs/tables, since the usage of videos as an in-
structional tool has been shown to significantly improve recall of
conceptual information and creative problem solving over other
mediums, particular for lower prior-knowledge participants [25].
Additionally, the video medium allowed us to track the amount of
information the participant received through view times.
The videos covered four types of information: (1) model architec-
ture, (2) data used to train the model, (3) the model’s performance
on a relevant subset of the data, and (4) prediction information
for a given question (the predicted probabilities of each class for
animal identification, or the predicted counts of each image for
crowd comparison).
We created 2 data videos (1 per application), 2 model videos
(1 per application), 8 performance videos (1 per subtask), and 32
prediction videos (1 per question)1. Videos ranged from 15 seconds
to 45 seconds. We limited the types of information provided to four
to keep the total length of videos for any given question under 2
minutes. Standards for model reporting are still in early stages of
research [26], so these four concepts were chosen based on current
norms for describing ML work. The videos were also constructed
such that even people without prior knowledge would be able to
understand at least part of the information. For example, when the
model video describes the architecture for the animal identification
model, we included high-level intuition and background about the
model (e.g., describing a convolutional neural network as “passing
parts of the image through various filters to learn patterns”). Each
video was displayed with English subtitles.
5 USER STUDY
This study was accepted by our institution IRB board, and partici-
pants were asked for consent prior to the study.
5.1 Treatments
Participants saw the knowledge assessment questions followed by
the task-based questions. Each task-based question was associated
with one of four treatments:
(1) NoRec: There is no recommendation provided.
(2) RecOnly: The ML recommendation is displayed with no addi-
tional information about the system.
(3) RecOptVid: The ML recommendation is displayed and four
categories of information about the system and results are avail-
able as videos. Participants are free to view any or none of those
videos.
(4) RecForceVid: The recommendation and additional information
are available as in RecOptVid. Participants are required to view
all videos at least once.
Every participant saw all eight subtasks, and each of the four
subtasks within an application had a different treatment that was
applied for all questions in the subtask. The assignment of treatment
to subtaskwas random. Because some of the informationwas shared
between subtasks, we showed all the subtasks from a particular
application in succession. The order of the applications, the order
of the subtasks within the application, and the order of questions
within the subtask were random.
5.2 Procedure
Each participant was given an account on a web application for the
study. After logging in, participants saw the following:
(1) An introductory text describing the types of questions, expected
study length, and audio component for the videos.
(2) The knowledge assessment questions.
(3) A 2-minute training video walking through the task-based ques-
tions and the different treatments.
1All videos are available to view at https://github.com/harinisuresh/ml-trust-materials
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Figure 3: Screenshot of a question as delivered by thewebapp for the
study. This question has the RecForceVid treatment. In treatment
RecOptVid, the videos appear in the same way, but participants are
able to click an answer and proceed without watching any videos.
In treatment RecOnly, only the recommendation appears, and in
treatment NoRec treatment, only the question and choices appear.
(4) Three comprehension-check questions about the training video
that must be answered correctly to proceed.
(5) The task-based questions. For each application, and for every
subtask in the application (randomly ordered):
• A training page with three examples of problems in the
subtask with their ground-truth answers.
• Four subtask questions (randomly ordered); recommenda-
tions and explanatory videos shown depending on the treat-
ment for the subtask.
To check for validity, each participant was given 8 repeated ques-
tions: 3 in the knowledge assessment section and 5 in the task-based
section (randomized but limited to one per subtask). Participants
needed to answer a majority of these repeated questions with the
same answer as the original question to be considered valid. Each
participant saw 22 knowledge assessment questions, 32 task-based
questions, and 8 repeated questions for a total of 54 questions.
5.3 Apparatus
We built a web application to deliver the study. Each question
appeared on a separate page with the image (if applicable) and radio
buttons for answer choices. The study immediately proceeded after
an answer click was detected to mitigate click fatigue. Participants
could pause the study.
If a question had the RecOptVid or RecForceVid treatments, all
4 videos appeared above the question. Unwatched videos had a
red border, videos that had been partially watched in a previous
or the current question had a yellow border, and videos that had
been watched in their entirety in a previous or the current question
Gender Num. Percentage
Male 86 49.1%
Female 86 49.1%
Other 2 1.1%
Prefer Not to Answer 1 <1%
Ethnicity
White 81 46.3%
Aisan/Pacific Islander 37 21.1%
Black or African American 25 14.3%
Hispanic or Latinx 15 8.6%
Native American or American Indian 9 5.1%
Other 4 2.3%
Prefer not to answer 4 2.3%
Age
18-24 73 41.7%
25-34 39 22.3%
35-44 51 29.1%
45-64 12 6.9%
Highest Education Level
Less than high school diploma 1 <1%
High school diploma 19 10.9%
Two-year college degree / AA / AS 11 6.3%
Four-year college degree / BA / BS 69 39.4%
Master’s degree (e.g. MA, MS, MEd) 28 16.0%
Professional Degree (e.g. MD, DDS) 25 14.3%
Doctorate degree (e.g. PhD, EdD) 22 12.6%
Table 1: Demographic information for the 175 study participants.
appeared with a green border. A sample screenshot of the study is
shown in Fig. 3.
Videos immediately expanded to fullscreen when clicked and
automatically paused when minimized. This prevented users from
viewing anything else on the screen while the video was playing,
or from playing multiple videos at once. Users could not seek for-
wards past their furthest watched time (but seeking backwards
was allowed). For questions in treatment RecForceVid, the answer
options were unclickable with the text “For this question, you must
watch all unwatched videos before proceeding” until all videos
were watched fully.
6 PARTICIPANTS
We recruited participants for this study by posting on public email
lists, Reddit, and Facebook groups. Interested parties filled out
a Qualtrics survey that collected demographic information and a
contact email.We also asked people to self-rank theirML knowledge
on a 5-point scale. From the initial survey, we selected participants
based on demographic characteristics and self-reported expertise
in order to maintain a diverse population. We created accounts for
each selected participant which were delivered via email with a
link to the study website.
In total, 175 participants successfully completed the survey and
passed the repeated question check. Gender, ethnicity, age and
education level breakdowns are presented in Tab. 1.
Each participant was remunerated with a reward of $10 via an
e-gift card. 10% and 5% of participants were randomly chosen to
receive an additional $25 and $50, respectively. We did not award
additional money for correct answers so as not to incentize cheating
(e.g., with Google reverse image search).
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6.1 Knowledge Assessment Results
We designed the knowledge assessment questions to range in dif-
ficulty, which was confirmed by the range of participant perfor-
mances across questions. The easiest question was answered cor-
rectly by 76% of participants, and the hardest was answered cor-
rectly by 13.1%. The lower quartile of participant performance
was 27.6%, and the upper quartile was 60.4%, indicating that the
distribution was fairly balanced with a higher concentration of
intermediate-level questions.
Of the 5 “easy” questions (defined as those with participant
performance higher than the upper quartile), 2 were Logic, 2 were
Math, and 1 was ML. Of the 12 “intermediate” questions (those with
participant performance between the lower and upper quartiles), 1
was Logic, 6 were Math, and 6 were ML. Of the 5 “hard” questions
(those with participant performance below the lower quartile), 1
was Math and 4 were ML. The following table maps each question
to its difficulty level:
Easy L2, L3, M1, M2, ML1
Intermediate L1, M3, M4, M5, M6, M8,
ML2, ML3, ML4, ML5, ML6, ML10
Hard M7, ML7, ML8, ML9, ML11
Table 2: Breakdown of questions across difficulty levels. The topics
corresponding to each question are listed in Section 4.1.
6.2 Expertise Assignment
In the demographic survey, we asked participants to self-rank their
ML background from 1-5 (1: No knowledge, 2: Novice, 3: Inter-
mediate, 4: Advanced, 5: Expert) as a preliminary way to choose
participants with varying knowledge. In analysis, we used partic-
ipant responses to the knowledge assessment to more accurately
assign expertise along two axes: Math/Logic (shorthand ’Math’) and
ML. We gave each participant two scores corresponding to the per-
centage of the 11 Math/Logic asessment questions they answered
correctly and the percentage of the 11 ML assessment questions
they answered correctly. Scores were evenly distributed along the
Math axis, so we set the boundary at 50%, resulting in ‘Low Math’
and ‘High Math’. ML scores were not as evenly distributed. We
first set a ‘High ML’ boundary to separate a small, distinct cluster
of 19 participants with high ML scores (>60%). We then set an-
other boundary at the halfway point of the remaining scores (30%),
resulting in ‘Low ML’ and ‘Medium ML’. The participants were
thus categorized into five expertise groups: ‘Low Math-Low ML’
(59), ‘Low Math-Medium ML’ (33), ‘High Math-Low ML’ (33), ‘High
Math-Medium ML’ (31), and ‘High Math-High ML’ (19).
We analyzed the differences between self-reported and assessment-
assigned expertise groups and found that self-reported expertise
was often unreliable, particularly for lower knowledge participants.
People with Low ML assessment scores self-reported nearly evenly
across all 5 ML expertise levels. In fact, there were more Low ML
participants who self-reported as “Experts” than either the Medium
or HighML groups. These discrepancies confirm that the implemen-
tation of a separate assessment was necessary to more accurately
gauge people’s ML expertise.
7 FINDINGS
Participant responses to the task-based questions were analyzed
using one-way within-subject ANOVA and the Tukey-Kramer test
(All Pairs, Tukey HSD) across treatments. We used an alpha level
of 0.05 for all statistical tests. All p-values are significant for the
number of independent pair-wise comparisons using the Bonferroni
correction. Our findings are summarized as follows, and detailed in
the coming subsections:
• People generally follow ML recommendations. This was
the case across all expertise groups, and more so if the recom-
mendations came with information about the ML system in the
form of videos.
• People follow incorrect ML recommendations for tasks
they predominantly complete correctly, including experts.
• Although participants followed incorrect recommendations in
general, they were followed significantly less often than cor-
rect recommendations, and incorrect-abnormal recommen-
dations were followed significantly less than incorrect-
normal recommendations.
• Neither model, data, performance, nor prediction infor-
mation improvedpeople’s accuracy, even for incorrect-abnormal
recommendations where the prediction video or image char-
acteristics suggested that the recommendation should be less
trustworthy.
7.1 People generally follow recommendations
Overall analysis of participant responses revealed that people gen-
erally follow ML recommendations when they are provided, across
treatments and applications. Additionally, participants who were
given more information about the ML system and the recommenda-
tion in treatments RecOptVid and RecForceVid followed the recom-
mendation more often than participants who only received the ML
recommendation (treatment RecOnly) for both applications (Fig. 4).
Animal Identification: Participants with the NoRec treatment
answered the same as the hidden recommendations 50.7% of the
time. However, when participants were shown ML recommenda-
tions, they answered the same as the recommendation 84.4% of the
time on average. There were statistically significant differences in
agreement between NoRec and each of the other treatments that
showed ML recommendations [ANOVA: F(3, 696) = 107.48, p <
0.0001; Tukey HSD: p < 0.0001 for all (NoRec, {RecOnly, RecOptVid,
RecForceVid}) pairs]. Recommendation agreement increased 2.2%
from RecOnly to RecOptVid and 3.7% from RecOnly to RecForceVid.
These increases were not statistically significant.
Crowd Comparison: Participants with the NoRec treatment an-
swered the same as the hidden recommendations 50.4% of the
time, while participants who were shown ML recommendations
answered the same as the recommendations 77.5% of the time.
There were statistically significant differences in agreement be-
tween NoRec and each of the other treatments [F(3, 696) = 62.90,
p < 0.0001; p < 0.0001 for all (NoRec, {RecOnly, RecOptVid, Rec-
ForceVid}) pairs]. We observe an increase of 2.8% from RecOnly to
RecOptVid and an increase of 8% from RecOnly to RecForceVid.
Only the RecOnly and RecForceVid treatment pair had a statistically
significant difference [p = 0.0073].
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Figure 4: Percentage of questions where the ML recommendation
was followed per treatment, for both applications. Error bars rep-
resent standard errors.
Figure 5: Percentage of questions where the ML recommendation
was followed per treatment, per expertise group, for both applica-
tions combined. Error bars represent standard errors.
Figure 6: Performances per treatment, per application, separated
by the correctness of the ML recommendation (COR = correct, INC
= incorrect). Error bars represent standard errors.
Figure 7: Performances for questions with incorrect recommenda-
tions per treatment, per expertise group, for both applications com-
bined. Error bars represent standard errors.
By Expertise: There were statistically significant increases in
agreement rate between NoRec questions and questions where
recommendations were shown for every expertise group (Fig. 5)
[Low Math-Low ML: F(1, 116) = 142.54, p < 0.0001; Low Math-
Medium ML: F(1, 64) = 100.45, p < 0.0001; High Math-Low ML: F(1,
64) = 48.91, p < 0.0001; High Math-Medium ML: F(1, 60) = 64.64, p
< 0.0001; High Math-High ML: F(1, 36) = 12.48, p = 0.0011].
7.2 Incorrect recommendations are convincing
Analysis of participant responses across questions with correct vs.
incorrect ML recommendations revealed that people are willing
to go against their intuition to follow a recommendation even if
they complete the task correctly the majority of the time without a
recommendation (Fig. 6); this trend is true even for ML experts.
Animal Identification: Participants answered questions correctly
58.7% of the time overall without a recommendation. There was no
statistically significant difference in performance across questions
with correct versus incorrect recommendations for participants who
did not receive recommendations (59.4% vs. 58%), indicating that
these questions did not inherently vary in difficulty. However, for
questions where participants were given the correct recommenda-
tion, participants performed on average 31.3% better than in NoRec,
which was statistically significant [F(3, 696) = 69.95, p < 0.0001; p
< 0.0001 for all (NoRec, {RecOnly, RecOptVid, RecForceVid}) pairs].
For questions where participants were given the incorrect recom-
mendation, they performed 36.1% worse than in NoRec, which was
also statistically significant [F(3, 696) = 52.22, p < 0.0001; p < 0.0001
for all (NoRec, {RecOnly, RecOptVid, RecForceVid}) pairs].
Crowd Comparison: Participants answered questions correctly
71.9% of the time overall without a recommendation. There was
no statistically significant difference in performance for the NoRec
treatments for questions with correct vs. incorrect recommenda-
tions (72.3% vs. 71.4%). However, for questions where participants
were given the correct recommendation, they performed 18.1% bet-
ter than in NoRec, which was statistically significant [F(3, 696) =
24.46, p < 0.0001; p < 0.0001 for all (NoRec, {RecOnly, RecOptVid,
RecForceVid}) pairs]. For questions where participants were given
the incorrect recommendation, they performed 36% worse than in
NoRec, which was statistically significant [F(3, 696) = 47.12, p <
0.0001; p < 0.0001 for all (NoRec, {RecOnly, RecOptVid, RecForce-
Vid}) pairs].
The baseline NoRec performance for the crowd comparison ap-
plication (71.9%) was significantly higher than the baseline for the
animal identification application (58.7%), but the final accuracies
for questions where the correct recommendation was given are
approximately the same and extremely high for both tasks (90.7%
for animal identification and 90.4% for crowd comparison). The de-
creases in performance after receiving incorrect recommendations
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were also approximately equal for both tasks (36.1% for animal
identification and 36% for crowd comparison).
By Expertise: Therewere no statistically significant differences be-
tween the baseline NoRec performances across the expertise groups.
However, there were statistically significant decreases in perfor-
mance from NoRec to each of the RecOnly/RecOptVid/RecForceVid
treatments for all expertise groups except for High Math-High ML,
which only had statistical significance from NoRec to RecForceVid
(Fig. 7). While not statistically signficant, receiving more informa-
tion tends to decrease performance for the lower expertise groups,
while for the higher expertise groups this trend is not present (High
Math-High ML) or is slightly reversed (High Math-Medium ML).
Although participants in all expertise groups still followed incor-
rect recommendations overall, participants in the High Math-High
ML group performed statistically significantly better than partici-
pants in all the other groups except for High Math-Medium ML for
questions where incorrect recommendations were shown [F(4, 170)
= 4.48, p = 0.0018; p = 0.0109 for (*, Low Math-Low ML), p = 0.0009
for (*, Low Math-Medium ML), p = 0.0276 for (*, High Math-Low
ML)].
Prior math knowledge also seemed to have more effect than
ML knowledge on performance for questions with incorrect rec-
ommendations that showed videos. For participants with Medium
ML knowledge, those who had High Math knowledge performed
statistically significantly better than their Low Math counterparts
for the RecForceVid treatment [F(4, 170) = 5.34, p = 0.0005; p =
0.0096 for (High Math-Medium ML, Low Math-Medium ML)], even
though there was no significant difference in these groups for the
RecOnly treatment. There were no statistically significant differ-
ences in performance when comparing across LowML and Medium
ML, holding Math knowledge constant.
7.3 Abnormal recommendations are followed
less
Participants disagreed with shown correct recommendations 9.5%
of the time, andwith shown incorrect recommendations 28.7% of the
time. The incorrect recommendations designated as “abnormal” also
had a significantly higher rate of recommendation disagreement
than the incorrect recommendations designated as “normal” for
both applications (Fig. 8).
Animal Identification: Participants did not follow a correct rec-
ommendation 9.3% of the time, whereas they did not follow an
incorrect recommendation 21.9% of the time — split between 28.4%
for incorrect-abnormal recommendations and 15.4% for incorrect-
normal recommendations. There were statistically significant dif-
ferences between all three of these values [F(2, 522) = 29.14, p <
0.0001; p < 0.0001 for (COR_NORM, {INC_ABNORM, INC_NORM})
pairs, p = 0.0450 for (INC_ABNORM, INC_NORM)].
Crowd Comparison: Participants did not follow a correct rec-
ommendation 9.6% of the time, whereas they did not follow an
incorrect recommendation 35.4% of the time on average — split
between 40.6% for incorrect-abnormal recommendations and 30.3%
for incorrect-normal recommendations. There were statistically
significant differences between all three of these values [F(2, 522)
= 50.51, p < 0.0001; p < 0.0001 for (COR_NORM, {INC_ABNORM,
INC_NORM}) pairs, p = 0.0032 for (INC_ABNORM, INC_NORM)].
Figure 8: Percentage of questions where participants disagreed with
a shown recommendation per application, per the 3 recommenda-
tion types. Error bars represent standard errors.
It is interesting to note that while participants disagreed with
recommendations at similar rates when given correct recommen-
dations in the animal identification and crowd comparison tasks
(9.3% and 9.6%), the crowd comparison task had significantly higher
disagreement rates than the animal identification task for both
incorrect-abnormal recommendations [F(1, 348) = 10.83, p = 0.0011]
and incorrect-normal recommendations [F(1, 348) = 25.20, p <
0.0001]. This difference between the two applications may be corre-
lated to the baseline difficulty of the task (crowd comparison: 71.9%
NoRec accuracy, animal identification: 58.7% NoRec accuracy).
7.4 Information does not improve accuracy
In this study, we used videos about the ML system and recom-
mendation as a way to provide transparency. As we saw in Figs.
6 and 7, offering videos simply led to participants following the
ML recommendation more, and did not improve participant perfor-
mance for questions with incorrect recommendations. For incorrect
recommendations, watching explanatory videos did not improve
performance over the NoRec baselines for either task or any exper-
tise groups. For participants who watched the performance videos,
there was also no correlation between the stated performance of
the model on a subtask, and participants’ trust of the model for
that subtask. Performances ranged from 72% to 87% for animal
identification, and from 72% to 93% for crowd comparison.
We also analyzed the rate at which participants followed recom-
mendations based on whether or not they had watched each of the
4 types of videos. Across all 3 recommendation types and all 4 video
types, watching any video increased the recommendation agree-
ment rate, even for incorrect-abnormal recommendations where
the video about prediction information showed extremely low ML
probabilities (Fig. 2, bottommost).
Correct Recommendations: There were statistically significant
increases in recommendation agreement between the not-watched
and watched-in-question states for the performance videos [F(2,
500) = 4.87, p = 0.0080; p = 0.0071] and prediction videos [F(1, 348) =
7.60, p = 0.0061]. There were observable increases in agreement for
the data and model videos as well from not-watched to watched-
in-question.
Incorrect-Normal Recommendations: There were statistically sig-
nificant increases in recommendation agreement between the not-
watched and watched-in-question states for all videos. The data
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videos had F(2, 370) = 3.85, p = 0.0222; p = 0.0264]. The model videos
had F(2, 378) = 3.87, p = 0.0218; p = 0.0224]. The performance videos
had F(2, 449) = 6.44, p = 0.0017; p = 0.0012. The prediction videos
had F(1, 348) = 12.44, p = 0.0005.
Incorrect-Abnormal Recommendations: There were no statistically
significant differences between watch states for any of the videos,
but we observed this increasing pattern between not-watched and
watched-in-question for all 4 videos.
By Expertise: Interestingly, participants in higher Math and ML
knowledge groups who watched prediction videos disagreed more
with the incorrect-abnormal recommendations than if they had not
watched the videos. Lower knowledge groups agreed more after
watching those same videos (Fig. 9).
Animal Identification: For questions that showed incorrect-abnormal
recommendations, there were decreases in recommendation dis-
agreement rate from not-watched to watched for both Low Math
groups. However, there were increases in recommendation disagree-
ment rate from not-watched to watched for the High Math-Low
ML, High Math-Medium ML group and the High Math-High ML
group. The only statistically significant difference was in the High
Math-Medium ML group [F(1, 60) = 4.28, p = 0.0428].
CrowdComparison: For questions that showed incorrect-abnormal
recommendations, there were decreases in recommendation dis-
agreement rate from not-watched to watched for both Low Math
groups and for the High Math-Low ML group. However, there were
increases in recommendation disagreement rate from not-watched
to watched for the High Math-Medium ML group and the High
Math-High ML group. The only statistically significant difference
was in the Low Math-Low ML group [F(1, 116) = 8.03, p = 0.0054].
The positive differences between not-watched and watched were
higher in the animal identification application than in the crowd
comparison application. This may be because incorrect-abnormal
examples in the animal application had very low, close probabilities
(Fig. 2, bottom), while the abnormalities in the crowd comparison
application were more subtle, e.g., a poorly lit image.
8 LIMITATIONS
The remote and web-based nature of the study is limited; e.g., we
were not able to ensure that participants were paying attention
throughout the study. Although the participants could not switch
screens while videos were playing, we could not be sure that they
were focused on the screen. Additionally, the tasks we present
are scenarios described online, not in-person scenarios with real
consequences. As a result, trust and behavior in real scenarios might
differ from what we observe in this study.
9 DISCUSSION
Our study contributes three key insights into human-ML interaction
and trust:
1. People trust ML recommendations when they should
not. In our study, we found that even when people (a) are able
to perform the task correctly the majority of the time without an
ML recommendation, (b) are given information that points to very
low system confidence, and (c) have the expertise to understand
it, they still follow an incorrect ML recommendation. This result
agrees with prior work suggesting that people over-rely on ML
(a)
(b)
Figure 9: Percentage of questions where participants disagreed with
a shown incorrect-abnormal recommendation per task where (a) is
animal identification and (b) is crowd comparison, per watch state
of the prediction video, per expertise group. Error bars represent
standard errors.
recommendations [24, 29, 34], and builds upon it by confirming
this claim across five different math/logic/ML expertise levels. Ide-
ally, ML recommendations should augment human performance
by providing support for decisions where people would otherwise
make mistakes; in conjunction, humans should be able to recognize
signals indicating that a recommendation is less trustworthy, and
then rely more on their own judgement. Our findings show some
promise in that people disregard incorrect recommendations more
often than correct ones. However, incorrect recommendations, even
those that suggest low trustworthiness, are still overwhelmingly
followed. This finding strongly motivates continued research into
effective ways to communicate a model’s limitations.
2. Relevant, curated system information should be prior-
itized over quantity to avoid over-reliance. Other work has
studied the effect of system information on trust in specific do-
mains or with narrow categories of information [3, 6, 32, 39], and
we build upon this with similar findings for four different types of
information. Policy-makers are pushing for increased transparency
into ML systems, and people affected by these systems deserve to
have access to this information as well. However, simply providing
comprehensive system/prediction information is not sufficient, and
may wrongly lead people to follow incorrect recommendations. The
type of information that will be helpful to real users will be differ-
ent for each application and needs to be developed through deeply
engaging with end-users. Moreover, figuring out the best way to
communicate this information to users is an equally necessary area
of study.
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3.Math and logic skills may be as important as ML skills
for people who need to interpret the results of ML systems.
Many current resources for learning ML are aimed at ML practi-
tioners, computer scientists, or those with an existing technical
background. Although few of these resources are understandable to
the general public, ML will certainly be used by people from a range
of educational backgrounds and occupations. Currently, many ed-
ucators who teach ML to non-technical audiences actively avoid
teaching with math altogether [36]. However, our findings motivate
the importance of developing resources that teach the necessary
math and logic skills in concurrence with ML skills specifically for
these non-technical audiences.
This work is a step towards ML systems that work together with
human users to deliver the positive impact they promise.
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